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Abstract
Does the ratification of an international environmental agreement (IEA) reduce
a country’s competitiveness on world markets? In this paper, we take a gravity re-
gression approach to answering this question by using industry-level bilateral trade
data and employing time-varying country fixed effects to control for the endogeneity
of treaty participation. We find that ratifying an IEA has significant (albeit small)
negative effects on the exports of a country’s median manufacturing industry as well
as a compositional shift towards exporting cleaner goods. However, we also show that
this negative competitive effect on the median manufacturing industry disappears in
the long-run. In fact, the positive compositional shift becomes stronger in the long-run
as a ratifying country sees a further decline in exports of dirtier industries which is
more than compensated for by an increase in exports of cleaner industries, with an
overall positive but negligeble effect on employment.
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1 Introduction
Between 1976 and 2011 (i.e., the period considered in this paper) manufacturing as a
percent of GDP declined from 22% to 12% in the U.S. and from 27% to 14% in Europe.
Roughly the same period saw a decline in manufacturing employment from 31% of total
employment in the U.S. in 1980 to just 17% in 2010. A similar decline, from 36% to 25%,
occurred in Europe.1 Several recent studies (e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2016), Autor et al. (2016),
and Pierce and Schott (2016)) have pointed to globalization as a significant cause of such
declines in high-income countries. Recently, these analyses have received a great deal of
attention as the decline in manufacturing employment has been associated with increased
income inequality, significant social change, and political pressures.2 It is noteworthy that
many people also tie the decline in the relevance of the manufacturing sector and employ-
ment to increased environmental standards in high-income countries. For example, survey
evidence (e.g., from WorldPublicOpinion.org) suggests that a sizable majority of the Amer-
ican public believes that the U.S. strong environmental standards place it at a competitive
disadvantage in global markets. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that the decision to
join an international environmental agreement (IEA) is often controversial with much of the
discussion centering around its effects on “competitiveness” in global markets (e.g., see the
debate regarding whether the U.S. should have ratified the Kyoto protocol).
Given the relevance of the topic and the surrounding political debate over the past several
decades, it could be assumed that we possess causal evidence that links the ratification of
IEAs with losses of comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector of high-income coun-
tries. Instead, systematic evidence of this kind is limited and this is the very gap addressed
by this paper. Starting from the premise that increased environmental regulation may in-
crease production costs (at least for the most polluting industries), we analyze the effect of
IEA ratification on bilateral industry-level exports within a gravity regression framework.
Previewing the results of our analysis, we find a small negative effect of IEA membership
on exports for the typical (median) manufacturing sector in the short-run. However, we
also find that this negative competitive effect disappears in the long-run. Thus, there is
little, if any at all, evidence that the proliferation of IEAs over the past several decades
has been a major contributor to the general trend of manufacturing decline in high-income
countries. Instead, we find a significant (both quantitatively and statistically) compositional
shift in exports away from “dirty” and towards “clean” industries the more IEAs an exporting
country ratifies (compared to its trade partners). What is especially interesting is that we
show that this compositional shift becomes stronger in the long-run. Thus, IEA ratification
does appear to have contributed to the decline in manufacturing production in certain (high
pollution-intensive) industries among member countries. However, this decline in dirty-good
1Manufacturing to GDP ratios are calculated from the UN National Accounts database while employment
ratios come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
2See, for example, Autor et al. (2013) who found not only negative effects of increased import competition
from China on local wages and employment in the U.S., but also increased use of social programs such as
disability insurance. In a similar vein, Dorn et al. (2014) link workers who face import competition with
lower earnings, increased likelihood of drawing disability benefits, and lower tenures. Subsequent papers have
tied globalization to many other outcomes (e.g., changes in marriage rates, health, political polarization).
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exports has been more than compensated by an increase in exports of cleaner industries
within these member countries. Translating these results in terms of employment, there is
evidence of job losses in the short run and a net positive (but not large) employment effects
in the long run.
The more recent literature on the impact of environmental policy on trade flows has
typically used instrumental variable approaches (to control for the endogeneity of environ-
mental policy) and panel data techniques (to address the unobserved heterogeneity across
panels in addition to the endogenous environmental policy choice). One strand of this lit-
erature exploits cross-industry variation in the stringency of environmental regulation (e.g.,
estimated by industry pollution abatement costs) to test if industries facing an increase in
environmental regulation observed a decline in net exports (e.g., see Ederington and Minier
(2003), Ederington et al. (2005), and Levinson and Taylor (2008)). Another exploits regional
variation in environmental stringency (e.g., estimated from survey data or fuel standards) to
test if regions that increased regulatory stringency saw a decline in economic activity (e.g.,
see Tobey (1990), Millimet and List (2004), Kellenberg (2009), and Broner et al. (2012)).
This paper is closer to the second vein as we are implicitly using the ratification of an IEA
as a proxy for the regulatory stringency of a country’s environmental policies. However, we
also exploit cross-industry variation in emissions intensities to investigate whether the ratifi-
cation of IEAs implies heterogenous effects across manufacturing industries. This approach
(combined with the long time series of our data set) allows us to investigate potential general
equilibrium effects (e.g., whether increased regulatory stringency actually increases exports
in cleaner manufacturing industries). In addition, the use of IEA membership data allows
us to address the policy-relevant question of how joining an IEA affects the competitiveness
of a country’s manufacturing exports on global markets.
The analysis conducted here is most comparable to that in Aichele and Felbermayr (2015),
who analyze the effect of ratifying the Kyoto protocol on imports, carbon dioxide (CO2) in-
tensity of imports, and the CO2 content of imports of member countries.3 In common with
their approach, we use a gravity framework along with time-varying country fixed effects to
control for endogenous participation in IEAs. However, we rely on a much expanded dataset
(i.e., 163 countries observed for almost 40 years versus their sample of 40 countries over the
period 1995-2007) and a much broader spectrum of environmental agreements to provide sys-
tematic evidence on a broad set of agreements, disentangling possible heterogeneous effects
by type of IEAs (i.e., targeting climate change, acid rain, or ozone depletion).4 Our long
time span also allows us to recover long-run effects of IEA participation. This is important
because the short-run effects of IEA ratification might differ from the long-run impact given
3Other relevant papers include Aichele and Felbermayr (2013) and De Santis (2012). Aichele and Fel-
bermayr (2013) uses data on 117 exporters and 128 importers from 1997-2007 (and employs matching econo-
metrics to attempt to control for endogenous participation) and estimates a negative effect of Kyoto mem-
bership on a country’s aggregate export flows. De Santis (2012) uses data on 24 countries between 1988-2008
(and a gravity specification with time invariant fixed effects that controls for unobserved heterogeneity but
not for the endogenous treaty participation) and estimates positive effects of Kyoto and Montreal protocol
memberships on a country’s exports.
4It is our focus on the competitiveness effects of IEAs that allows us to expand the dataset, since our
approach requires little in terms of individual country and sector-specific emissions data.
2
lags arising from large fixed costs and uncertain emission-abatement innovations in manu-
facturing industries. Indeed, we find that the compositional change in trade flows changes
dramatically in the long run with positive but small effects on employment.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a non-technical presen-
tation of the theoretical and empirical work that analyzes how IEAs may affect exports, as
well as summary of the IEAs included in the empirical analysis. Section 3 presents details
about the data that we use and the construction of the covariates. Section 4 discusses the
empirical approach and the baseline results: that ratifying an IEA leads to a compositional
shift towards exporting cleaner manufacturing goods as well as a decline in net exports of
the median manufacturing industry. In section 5 we distinguish between import and export
flows to analyze the potential for IEA membership to lead to pollution leakage (i.e., IEA
ratification leading to increased imports of dirty goods from non-member countries). Section
6 isolates the long-run effects of IEA ratification and shows that while the compositional shift
towards cleaner exports gets stronger over time, the negative effect on the competitiveness
of the median manufacturing industry disappears. Indeed, back-of-the-envelope calculations
show no relationship between IEA membership and the long-run decline in manufacturing
employment in high-income countries like the U.S. and Germany. Finally, Section 7 con-
cludes.
2 International Environmental Agreements and Exports
This paper is concerned with IEAs as a source of comparative (dis)advantage for man-
ufacturing industries and how they impact export performance, with the possibility that
the impact is larger for pollution-intensive sectors. The basic mechanism is that ratifying
an IEA commits a country to emission targets and/or pollution regulations that raise the
cost of production within an industry. This cost can be direct (e.g., the incurrence of pol-
lution abatement costs to reduce emissions or higher energy costs) or indirect (e.g., product
standards which raise the cost of producing the good or regulations which increase the cost
of intermediate inputs). In order to delve deeper in the consequences of these costs, the
next subsection provides a theoretical background to understand that the effects need not
be negative even if IEAs lead to cost. Furthermore, the effects may be different at different
time horizons. With this understanding, the following subsection discusses the framework
for IEA adoption and describes the three type of agreements (i.e., acid rain, ozone depletion,
and climate change) that we include in the empirical analysis.
2.1 Theoretical Background
In investigating the effect of environmental regulations on industry competitiveness our
paper adds to an already vast literature (see Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2017) for a recent
survey). As mentioned, our approach is closest to those papers that use regional variation in
environmental stringency. However, what makes our approach unique is not only the focus
5Indeed, one of the main arguments of Ederington et al. (2005) is that emissions-intensive industries
tend to have large fixed costs, which results in relocation only taking place slowly and with long lags.
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on IEAs as a potential source of comparative disadvantage but also the long time-span of
our data (1976-2011). This allows more flexibility in looking for both general-equilibrium
shifts in production across sectors but also Porter-type induced innovation in response to
environmental regulations.
First, consider an increase in environmental regulations brought about by attempting to
achieve an overall emissions target. This will obviously affect some sectors, which emit the
targeted pollutant intensively (i.e., dirty industries), more than others. While we expect to
see negative competitiveness effects from IEA ratification on the more pollution-intensive
manufacturing sectors, it is possible that even so-called clean sectors are negatively affected
– either through upstream/downstream linkages with the dirty industries or through a rise
in production costs from more costly inputs such as energy or transportation. However, at
least in an open economy, one would expect a general equilibrium shift in production towards
those cleaner sectors. The underlying mechanism is simple: some resources employed within
the pollution-intensive sectors, which shrink because of regulation, are freed up and can be
cheaply employed within the cleaner sectors that, in turn, expand. In this scenario, IEAs
ratification implies a compositional shift in a nation’s production and exports, with cleaner
industries accounting for a larger share of output and outflows. However, these compositional
shifts in production might happen only gradually over time given factor specificity and convex
adjustment costs. Indeed, Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson models with perfect factor mobility
were commonly viewed as long-run models in the trade literature, with short-run models
typically assuming some form of capital specificity (e.g., see Neary (1978)). This implies
that the competitiveness effects of an IEA in the short-run might be very different than the
long-run effects with the main prediction we see from general equilibrium models such as
Neary (1978) is that the compositional shifts from IEA membership should be larger in the
long-run.
However, it is also possible to observe the substitution of domestic production with im-
ported goods from countries outside the IEA (i.e., pollution leakage). This is the so-called
pollution haven effect, which has caused concerns both for the politics of IEAs ratification
(concerns about the competitiveness of manufacturing industries are central to these discus-
sions) as well as the effectiveness of the IEAs themselves (the extent to which IEAs reduce
global emissions versus simply shifting production towards low-regulation regions).6 These
concerns are especially pronounced for the multilateral environmental agreements studied in
this paper, which target global pollutants, where member country abatement efforts might
simply be offset by increasing production, and thus emissions, in non-member countries.
Alternatively, the so-called “Porter hypothesis” (see Porter and van der Linde (1995))
can be at play, in which environmental regulation acts as a catalyst for further research, in-
novation, and efficiency gains. In the strong version of the Porter hypothesis, more stringent
regulations actually translate into increased competitiveness on the domestic and interna-
tional fronts. While there is little evidence that such innovations can offset the costs of
environmental regulations sufficiently to actually increase firm competitiveness, several pa-
6See Copeland and Taylor (1994, 2005) for a discussion about the pollution haven effect. For an early
theoretical discussion regarding the locational choice of industries in the presence of environmental regulation
and regulation in general refer to McGuire (1982).
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pers have found evidence that increased environmental regulations induce the development
of new pollution-abatement technologies. For example Newell et al. (1999) and Popp (2002)
find that higher energy prices lead to new technologies in energy efficiency while Jaffe and
Palmer (1997) and Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) find that stricter regulations lead to
more environment-related patents. And Morgenstern et al. (2001) outline the existence of
an overlap between production activities and regulation-compliance efforts.7 Once again,
however, induced innovation is more of a long-run phenomenon suggesting another mecha-
nism by which the short-run competitiveness effects of an IEA might differ from its long-run
effects. However, in this case the predictions of the induced innovation models are different
than those of the general equilibrium models in that the negative effects of IEA on man-
ufacturing competitiveness should be less pronounced in the long-run and potentially the
compositional shifts towards cleaner production should be lower as well.8
In conclusion, the direction, magnitude, and time horizon of any trade effect stemming
from the ratification of IEAs is a quintessential empirical question, which is exactly what
this paper aims to answer.
2.2 International Environmental Agreements
The IEAs included in the analysis are listed in Table 1 and are divided into three groups
based on the global environmental problem they are designed to address. Each of these
categories (i.e., acid rain, ozone depletion, climate change) are described in more detail in
the following subsections.
2.2.1 Acid Rain IEAs
IEAs designed to tackle the issue of air pollution and its transboundary effects were
adopted as part of the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollu-
tion (LRTAP). Each of the subsequent protocols involved emission reduction targets aimed
at a particular chemical associated with transboundary air pollution: primarily sulphur ox-
ide (SOx), nitrogen oxide (NOx), non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC), and
ammonia (NH3).
The first acid rain protocol, Helsinki (1985), mandated a 30% reduction in sulphur emis-
sions while the subsequent Oslo (1994) protocol introduced additional reduction targets as
well national standards with respect to energy efficiency and the sulphur content of fuels.
The following Sofia protocol (1988) capped nitrogen oxide emissions at their 1987 levels and
introduced emission standards and controls for major emission sources. The 1991 Geneva
protocol to LRTAP was geared towards reducing emissions of volatile organic compounds
(VOCs). Specifically, parties agreed to decrease their emissions of VOCs by at least 30%
by 1999 (relative to 1988 levels). The Aarhus (1998) protocol mandated reductions for dis-
charges of heavy metals (cadmium, lead, and mercury). Although no specific targets were
7Other papers demonstrating induced innovation in response to environmental regulations include Aghion
et al. (2016) and Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016).
8This last prediction does require the additional assumption that any new technologies developed are
more effective in reducing costs in the more pollution-intensive manufacturing industries.
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introduced for annual emission levels, the protocol did emphasize concrete emission caps for
major discharge sources (primarily various combustion processes employed across an array
of industrial sectors). Under a second Aarhus protocol of 1998, parties were mandated to
cease the production and use of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) in accordance to their
specific timetables. However, some exemptions regarding the use of POPs were allowed.9
The protocol also mandated environmentally sound strategies for recycling, destruction, and
disposal of POPs. Similar to the protocol on heavy metals, the current agreement also
included a list of specific emission caps applicable to different stationary sources. Finally,
the 1999 Gothenburg protocol was aimed at targeting discharges associated with all of the
previously introduced pollutants, plus ammonia. In addition to the provisions introduced as
part of previous arrangements, the protocol added party-specific, emission reduction targets
for sulphur compounds (SO2), nitrogen oxides, ammonia, and non-methane volatile organic
compounds.
2.2.2 Ozone Depletion IEAs
IEAs aimed at reducing and controlling the emission of substances with ozone altering
and depletion characteristics were adopted under the auspices of the 1985 Vienna Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (VCPOL). This comprises the 1987 Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and its subsequent amendments, London (1990),
Copenhagen (1992), Montreal (1997), and Beijing (1999). Broadly speaking, the Montreal
protocol was centered on limiting the consumption and production of chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) and bromofluorocarbons (BFCs) relative to their calculated 1986 levels.
Subsequent amendments to the Montreal protocol targeted new substances with ozone al-
tering or depleting features and introduced phase-out schedules for the targeted compounds.
For example, the 1990 London amendment expanded the list of initial CFCs and mandated
the gradual elimination of both the listed CFCs and BFCs by 2000. Hydrochlorfluorocarbons
(HCFCs), also known as transitional substances, were developed as alternatives to CFCs but
these compounds also display ozone depletion characteristics, albeit much lower than those
of CFCs. HCFCs were added to the list of controlled substances under the 1992 Copenhagen
amendment and were scheduled for elimination by 2030. The Copenhagen amendment also
mandated the phase-out of CFCs (by 1995), BFCs (by 1993), carbon tetrachloride (by 1995)
and hydrobromofluorocarbons (HBFCs) (by 1996). The 1997 Montreal amendment intro-
duced a timetable for limiting the use and production of methyl bromide with a complete
phase-out by 2005. Finally, the 1999 Beijing amendment mandated a complete phase-out
of bromochloromethane by 2002. Additionally, it imposed significant consumption and pro-
duction limitations on HCFCs, thus accelerating their phase-out process.
It should be noted that the ozone depletion IEAs differ from the acid rain and climate
change IEAs in two ways. First, they focus more heavily on setting product standards
(i.e., the phase-out of the use of certain chemical compounds within products) as opposed
to overall emission reductions or process regulations. To the extent that these product
standards are applied to products originating from non-ratifying nations, the competitive
9The use of DDT, a pesticide, was permitted only in cases of absolute necessity (i.e., malaria and
encephalitis outbreaks) and for only one year after its production was stopped.
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effects of the Montreal protocol are potentially different than the climate change or acid
rain agreements which primarily involved process regulations (see discussion in Ederington
and Ruta (2016)). Indeed, the Montreal protocol and its subsequent amendments deviate
from the typical IEA structure in that they often included provisions regarding international
trade with non-members. Specifically, bans were introduced on both the import of controlled
substances and products containing them. Regulations on the import of products produced
with substances targeted under the protocol were also added.
Second, the substances targeted by the ozone agreements are associated with a different
set of industrial processes than the acid rain and climate change agreements. Our mea-
sures of industry pollution intensity (see Table 2) are based on emissions targeted by the
climate change and acid rain agreements and are quite highly correlated (see Table A1
in the Appendix). In contrast, according to a report published by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (see Sanz Sánchez et al. (2006)), the substances targeted by the
Montreal protocol were employed in a different set of industrial processes. These include
electronics and optical equipment, where the substances served as cleaning and de-greasing
agents for circuit boards, and machinery n.e.c., where the substances aided as refrigerants
for household and industrial air conditioning units, refrigerators, or freezers. The controlled
substances were also used as aerosol propellants in the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors,
or as solvents for the dry cleaning services. The compounds addressed under the protocol
were also involved in the manufacturing of insulating foams, or as refrigerants in mobile
air conditioning units, both of which were passed downstream to the transport equipment
sector.
This discussion highlights the distinct nature of the ozone depletion IEAs. Although
our empirical analysis does treat the three types of IEAs as homogenous, we later allow
for heterogeneity in our coefficient estimates across IEA types, as well as for alternative
measures of pollution intensity for the ozone depletion agreements.
2.2.3 Climate Change IEAs
Climate change IEAs were adopted as part of the 1992 United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Their end objective focuses on limiting and curbing
anthropogenic emissions of all greenhouse gases (GHGs) not covered by the Montreal proto-
col. Concrete GHG emission reduction targets were introduced as part of the Kyoto (1997)
protocol to the UNFCCC. Obviously, the principal provisions of the protocol centered around
reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. However, the protocol also sets emission targets for
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs),
and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
While similar to the acid rain IEAs in its focus on emission targets, the Kyoto protocol
argued for “common but differentiated” responsibilities among parties. Some Kyoto parties
10This set of countries excludes the U.S, which is included within Annex B but did not ratify the protocol.
Countries were primarily grouped into Annex B based on the level of development. Even among Annex
B countries there was flexibility with countries adopting different emissions targets, transitional countries
being offered special treatment and the adoption of various market based strategies (e.g., emission trading
between Annex B parties, Joint Implementation, and Clean Development Mechanisms) (see Grubb (2003)).
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(Annex B countries) adopted explicit emissions targets.10 In contrast, other parties (non-
Annex B) did not face mandated emission targets under the agreement. In this paper, we
focus on the set of countries that adopted explicit emission targets under the Kyoto agreement
(i.e., Annex B countries) although we revisit this assumption later in the robustness section
by distinguishing between Annex B and non-Annex B countries.
3 Data and Variable Construction
In order to test whether IEAs membership affects a country’s manufacturing exports,
three sets of data need to be merged: IEAs membership, sectoral emissions, and manufac-
turing trade flows.
Information on each nation’s IEAs membership is gathered from the International En-
vironmental Agreements Database Project (see Mitchell (2016)). In order to analyze the
effects of multilateral IEAs on trade, we focus on multilateral agreements that involve either
a negotiated reduction in emissions or the establishment of emission caps for one or more
substances. Thus, our analysis does not include the framework conventions, which typi-
cally outline the rules, objectives, and other fundamental principles under which subsequent
negotiations take place.11 Instead, we focus our attention on the 13 major multilateral en-
vironmental protocols and any subsequent amendments that established air emission targets
(or phase-out schedules) for member countries (i.e., acid rain, ozone depletion, and climate
change protocols and their subsequent amendments).
IEA membership typically involves a three-step process: signature, ratification, and entry
into force. As is common in the literature (see Slechten and Verardi (2016) and Aichele
and Felbermayr (2015) among many others), the year of ratification is used as the official
treatment date. By and large, the signature of IEAs is just a formality, with no immediate
implications for the parties and the ex-post ratification decision. In addition, even though
IEAs do not become legally binding until the date of entry into force, evidence (e.g. Baccini
and Urpelainen (2014)) suggests that parties begin the process of bringing their emissions
into compliance with the treaty obligations prior to that date.
Similar to Slechten and Verardi (2016), we use the count of ratified IEAs to measure a
nation’s environmental commitment. Thus, the relative measure of environmental stringency,
for a given country pair (xm) at time t is constructed as the difference between the number
of agreements ratified by the exporter (IEAxt) and importer (IEAmt):
d(IEA)xmt = IEAxt − IEAmt. (1)
As noted in Slechten and Verardi (2016), there is a fair degree of overlap in the timing
and membership of IEAs which makes identification of the impact of individual agreements
difficult (e.g., the acid rain agreements often occur within two or three years of each other
across a similar set of adopting nations). Thus, we aggregate IEAs into a single variable to
11The framework conventions do not include any any specific emission targets or phase-out schedules.
Consistent with this approach, we also record Kyoto membership based on whether countries adopted a
specific emissions target under the Kyoto framework. This distinction is explored in more detail in Section 4.3.
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provide an estimate of the average effect of the ratified treaties.12
By construction, the linear differential implies a constant effect across all IEAs considered,
regardless of their type. This strategy is suited to estimate the long-run effect of joining
IEAs across the entire sample period. However, the heterogeneity of IEAs is an important
dimension that should not be overlooked. Hence, we also construct relative measures of
environmental stringency similar to (1) by using the count of ratified IEAs for each of the
three IEA categories (i.e., acid rain, ozone deplation, and climate change) outlined in Section
2.2. The logic behind the bundling by category is simple and postulates that trade effects
are more likely to be homogenous for IEAs belonging to the same category.
Data on sectoral emissions and output at ISIC 2 (revision 3) level are from the Environ-
mental and Socio-Economic Accounts of the World Input Output Database (WIOD) (see
Genty et al. (2012)) and are available for a subsample of 40 countries between 1995 and
2009. Emission data is available for eight pollutants: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4),
carbon monoxide (CO), sulphur oxides (SOx), nitrous oxide (N2O), nitrogen oxides (NOx),
non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC), and ammonia (NH3). WIOD emission
data is compiled from various sources and is based on a combination of inventory-first meth-
ods (that, simply put, involve assigning emissions to each sector in accordance with its share
in overall production) and energy-first methods (that start with energy consumption involved
by different sectoral activities, proceed with scaling each activity by the appropriate emission
factor, and aggregating back up to sectoral level). In general, the inventory-first method is
typically used for calculating N2O, CH4 and NH3 emissions while the energy-first method is
used for NOx, SOx, NMVOC and CO. A combination of both is used for calculating sectoral
CO2 emissions.
Following Hettige et al. (1992, 1995), Broner et al. (2012), and Aichele and Felbermayr
(2015), we first define sectoral emissions intensity as annual emissions relative to annual
output.13 It is common in the literature to decompose changes in a country’s emissions
over time into scale (changes in emissions due to a change in aggregate output), technique
(changes in emissions due to a change in emission intensity), and composition (changes in
emissions due to a change in the composition of output) effects. Since we are interested in the
competitiveness effects of IEAs, it is important to isolate the effect of an IEA on industry
scale and composition by holding emissions intensity (i.e., the technique effect) constant.
Thus, to calculate sectoral emissions intensity we simply take sectoral averages over the 40
country, 14-year, WIOD subsample.14 Taking sectoral averages across countries and time
also reduces the possibility that country- or time-specific shocks are correlated with emissions
intensity data as well as allowing us to abstract from differences in calculation methods across
countries and time. The resulting average sectoral emissions are provided in Table 2 and
12Slechten and Verardi (2016) also emphasize the high degree of correlation across pollutants (see Table
A1 in the Appendix), which arises from the fact that industrial processes and other sources of pollution
often generate multiple pollutants. Thus, agreements aimed at reducing SOx emissions would also lead to a
reduction in CO2 emissions. This would suggest a degree of homogeneity in the effects on individual IEAs.
13Sectoral emission intensities are expressed in kilograms per $1,000 of output at 1995 prices. Sectoral
output is deflated using sector-specific price indexes.
14Emission intensity rankings do tend to be correlated across time and countries. Within the WIOD
subsample, the cross-country correlation is around 0.95 while the correlation over time is around 0.50.
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the rankings of industries by pollution intensity agree with prior expectations as industries
involving minerals and metals processing or the manufacture of chemicals tend to exhibit
high pollution intensities while industries associated with the production of textiles and food
products exhibit lower pollution intensities, which is consistent with the list of dirty sectors
constructed by Tobey (1990) who uses US pollution abatement operating costs. There is a
also higher degree of correlation in our industry rankings across the different emissions (with
the exception of N2O and NH3 which in turn are highly cotrrelated with each other; see Table
A1 in the Appendix for correlations in the emission intensities of the various pollutants).
From this data, we calculate several measures of sectoral pollution intensity (Ds). First,
following previous studies such as Broner et al. (2012) and Kahn (2000), we employ a binary
measure where we assign sectors into clean and dirty bins based on the properties of the
associated CO2 emission intensity distribution. Using the 75th percentile as a cut-off, we
identify four dirty industries: non-metallic minerals; coke, refined petroleum and nuclear
fuel; basic metals and fabricated metal; and chemicals and chemical products.15 Second,
as a continuous measure, we use the average sectoral emissions intensities calculated in
Table 2. Note that this gives us 8 different measures for each industry based on the 8
different pollutants. Third, as a means of combining sectoral emission intensities into a
single and continuous variable, we also construct a principal component (PC) of the eight
measured pollutants. This procedure aims at extracting the most information from the
individual components without multicollinearity concerns. On the negative side, the scale of
the variable is meaningless. We utilize the first component, PC1, which on its own accounts
for 59% of this information. Since it displays positive loadings on all emission intensities (see
panel A in Table A2 for details), it has the obvious interpretation that higher values denote
more polluting sectors.
Finally, trade data for 163 countries, observed as exporters and importers across manu-
facturing sectors, between 1976 and 2011 have been obtained from COMTRADE (see Table
A3 in the Appendix for the list of countries). Originally classified in SITC (revision 2),
exports have been matched into 14 ISIC 2 (revision 3) manufacturing sectors for the purpose
of merging them with sectoral emission data.16 In our regressions we also control for the
level of trade and economic integration between the two countries. To this end, we use the
data compiled by Jeffrey Bergstrand and his collaborators as part of the NSF - Kellogg In-
stitute Data Base on Economic Integration Agreements Project. Integration is measured on
a scale from 0 to 6, where 0 indicates no integration agreement between the two countries, 1
stands for a non-reciprocal preferential trade agreement, 2 is a reciprocal preferential trade
arrangement, 3 is a free trade agreement, 4 is customs union, 5 is a common market (i.e.,
the European Union) while level 6 denotes an economic union (e.g., the Eurozone).
15Notably the 75th percentile-based dirty bin is similar to that used in other studies that have used
pollution abatement costs per unit of value added (output, or total costs) or capital intensity to quantify
sectoral “dirtiness” (e.g., see Jänicke et al. (1997), Mani and Wheeler (1998), Ederington et al. (2005),
Kellenberg (2009), Grether et al. (2012), and Shapiro and Walker (2015)). The four sectors we identified
as dirty also top the emission intensity rankings for pollutants targeted by acid rain IEAs (i.e., SOx, NOx,
NMVOC, and NH3).
16The correspondence tables provided by Affendy et al. (2010) were used. Our special thanks to Dr.
Affendy for providing the correspondence table in Excel format.
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4 Empirics
We analyze the effect of IEAs on international trade flows within a gravity equation
framework, which is the standard tool for this type of ex-post empirical analysis (see Head
and Mayer (2014)). In doing so, we need to take into accounts any unobserved determinants
of trade flows. Often, these factors are exporter-, importer-, sector-, and time-specific (or
any combination of these dimensions) and may range from geographical, historical, and
cultural characteristics to infrastructure and preferences, to the sectoral supply and demand
capacities of the exporter and importer. In order to deal with this issue, we follow the
methodology of Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) and include time-varying country fixed effects.
Another issue to take into account is the endogenous nature of IEA adoption. However,
Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) also argue that the use of time-varying country fixed effects
is an effective means of reducing any biases that may arise from omitting the determinants
of IEA choices. This solution hinges on the fact that, like trade flows, IEA participation is
multilateral in nature, as is clearly the case for the major global environmental agreements
in our sample. That is, IEA participation depends on a country’s relations with all other
countries and, as a result, it is unlikely to be driven by just bilateral and time-varying
industry-level shocks (see Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) for a discussion). The use of panel
data techniques such as country-pair and time-varying fixed effects to account for latent
factors that might determine trade flows and treaty participation is long-standing in the
international trade literature – especially within the strand that analyzes trade agreements
and their impact on trade (e.g., Soete and Van Hove (2017), Baier et al. (2014), Regolo
(2013), Baier and Bergstrand (2007), or Baldwin and Taglioni (2007)). As a result, our
basic specification is given by:
lnTxmst = β1d(IEA)xmt+ β2d(IEA)xmt×Ds+ γTAxmt+ νxt+ νmt+ νst+ νxms+ xmst, (2)
where Txmst denotes the export flows from exporter x to importer m in sector s during year
t. The regressors of interest are d(IEA)xmt, which denotes the difference in the number of
ratified IEAs by the exporter and importer, and the interaction term between d(IEA)xmt
and Ds, which measures sectoral emission intensity (i.e., be it the log version of the eight
pollutants, the principal component, or the binary variable) with higher values indicating
more polluting industries. Thus, β1 captures the average effect of IEA membership on all
sectoral exports while β2 captures its effect on the cross-industry composition of exports.
Our only prior is that β2 < 0. That is, all else constant, the ratification of an additional IEA
by the exporting country reduces its exports by a greater degree in more pollution-intensive
manufacturing sectors.17
We also include TAxmt to account for the level of trade and economic integration between
the two countries. As discussed before, the variable is measured on a scale from 0 to 6 (with
higher values denoting deeper forms of integration) but the qualitative results are unchanged
17Given the symmetry of our specification, the ratification of an IEA by an importing country will shift
the composition of imports towards cleaner goods.
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if we use a dichotomous version (i.e., TAxmt = 1 if any type of trade agreement exists) or
with different dummy variables for each type of agreement.
As argued earlier, νxt and νmt are the sets of time-varying, country fixed effects designed
to control for unobserved trade determinants and the endogenous selection into IEAs. In
order to estimate β1, we follow Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) by imposing the restriction
that these fixed effects are symmetric across import and export flows (i.e., the specification
uses the same country dummy regardless of whether a country appears as an importer or
exporter in the bilateral relationship), although we also relax this assumption to verify that
it is not driving the results. Finally, we include a time-invariant bilateral fixed effect at the
industry-level (i.e., νxms) to control for common gravity variables and sectoral aspects that
do not vary over time (e.g., distance, common language, sector-specific transport costs). As
both Ederington et al. (2004) and Levinson (2009) document a general compositional shift
towards cleaner industries in both U.S. manufacturing production and imports (including
imports from non-OECD countries), there seems to be evidence of a global shift in production
towards cleaner goods. In consideration of the long span of our dataset (i.e., 36 years), we
control for any such global shifts by including industry-time fixed-effects (νst).18
In the next subsection, we present our baseline results first followed by a focus on the
heterogenous effects by sector and type of IEAs (i.e., acid rain, ozone depletion, and climate
change). We then engage in a series of robustness checks in terms of methodology, regressors
of interest, and samples. Taking stocks of these results, we address further questions related
to pollution leakage (Section 5) and potential differences between short and long-run effects
(Section 6).
4.1 Baseline Results
The results of our baseline specification are reported in Table 3, where each column uses a
different measure of sectoral emission intensity (Ds). Focusing first on β2 (i.e., the coefficient
for the interaction between the IEA stock differential and sectoral pollution intensity), it is
apparent that the estimates are negative and statistically significant in all but one specifi-
cation (i.e., when using NMVOC emission intensity). Thus, our estimations confirm that a
higher number of ratified IEAs, relative to one’s trading partner, leads to lower (net) exports
in the more pollution-intensive manufacturing sectors. To ease the interpretation of these
estimates, we report the marginal effects of IEA ratification on exports at different points
along the distribution of sectoral emission intensities at the bottom of the table.
In the first column, we use our binary measure of sectoral pollution intensity for Ds.
As can be seen, IEA membership has a statistically significant but quantitatively minor
effect on trade for our set of 10 clean industries, but a more substantial negative impact on
exports for the set of 4 industries identified as dirty. Specifically, our results suggest that,
holding all else constant, the ratification of an additional IEA will decrease exports in each
of the 4 dirty industries by around 2.5% (with a symmetric increase in imports). In contrast,
ratification of an additional IEA will decrease exports in our set of 10 clean industries by
only 0.6%. This pattern repeats itself throughout the specifications in this table. Specifically,
18The inclusion of time-varying industry fixed effects is not inconsequential as we uncover smaller com-
positional affects of IEAs on exports when they are included.
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while we see only a small impact on exports from IEA ratification in the majority of the
manufacturing sectors, we do observe significant compositional effects: quantitatively larger
declines in exports of the more emission-intensive manufacturing sectors.
In columns 2-10 of Table 3, we use average sectoral emissions intensities as measures of
Ds. As mentioned earlier, with respect to the compositional effect of IEA membership (β2),
the interaction term is consistently negative and highly significant (except for NMVOC). The
marginal effects illustrate that there are only small effects of IEA membership on exports of
the median manufacturing industry (typically, a decline in exports of around 1% or less). For
example, in terms of carbon dioxide emissions (CO2), the median industry saw a decline in
exports of only 0.7%. Thus, for the period under consideration (1976-2011), the ratification
of IEAs is only a minor source of comparative disadvantage for the typical (i.e., median)
manufacturing industry.
However, while the ratification of IEAs might have only small effects on exports of a
typical manufacturing industry, our results suggest it has larger effects on more pollution-
intensive industries and, thus, the composition of a country’s exports. The marginal effects
of IEA ratification on exports of the most pollution-intensive manufacturing industries point
to a decrease of 2-3% for each IEA joined. For example, the ratification of an additional
IEA results in a 3.2% decline in exports within the most-CO2 polluting industry (i.e., other
non-metallic minerals) over the sample period (holding membership status of the importing
country constant).
Finally, in column 10 of Table 3 we use the principal component measure as an indicator
of sectoral dirtiness. The results are qualitatively unchanged. That is, minor effects on
the median manufacturing industry (decline in exports of 0.9%) with larger comparative
disadvantage effects on the dirtiest industries (decline in exports of 3.1%).
4.2 Industry-Level Results
The marginal effects of our baseline results in Table 3 show that IEA ratification leads to a
compositional shift towards exporting relatively cleaner goods (and symmetrically importing
relatively dirtier goods). In order to allow for sectoral differences in the most flexible way,
we also estimate specification (2) on a sector-by-sector basis. This approach comes with
the added bonus of allowing the time-varying country fixed effects and the coefficient on
the IEA differential to differ across manufacturing sectors. Note that, in this case, we are
estimating our dIEA coefficient entirely from variation in trade flows across trading partners
(i.e., changes in net exports in trade relations with countries that ratify the IEA versus those
that do not).
The results are presented in Table 4 and mirror the conclusions of our benchmark speci-
fications. To facilitate interpretation, we have arranged the industries by their CO2 emission
intensity, from the most (other non-metalic minerals) to the least (leather and footwear) in-
tensive. For the most CO2-intensive industry, the estimates show a 5.1% decline in exports
that follows the ratification of an additional IEA. Similar declines of 2-4% appear in many of
the other dirtier sectors (i.e., basic metals, chemicals and chemical products, etc., which are
shown in the top half of Table 4). In contrast, the three industries with the lowest CO2 emis-
sion intensities (i.e., food, beverages and tobacco, textiles and textile products, and leather
and footwear) exhibit either no statistically/quantitatively significant negative effects of IEA
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ratification, or even a small positive effect regarding the latter. These results emphasize once
more the compositional shift towards cleaner exports for countries that adopt international
environmental agreements.
4.3 The Heterogeneity of IEAs
So far, our regressors of interest bundle the entire spectrum of IEAs (i.e., acid rain,
ozone depletion, and climate change) into a single, linear, differential, count variable. How-
ever, since it assumes symmetric effects across all agreements, regardless of their type, this
bundling may be too strong of an assumption. This is particularly the case for the ozone de-
pletion agreements since the pollutants that they target (primarily CFCs and BFCs) are not
included in the sectoral emissions intensity data and are not necessarily even correlated with
acid rain or climate change pollutants. For example, the discussion about ozone depletion
agreements in Section 2.2.2 suggests that machinery n.e.c. and transportation equipment
are among the affected sectors. However, neither of the two is a significant source of either
acid rain or climate change-relevant emissions.
Thus, we now re-estimate specification (2) while allowing the coefficient estimates to
vary across the three major categories of IEAs: acid rain (AR), ozone depletion (OD), and
climate change (CC).19 The rationale behind the split is simple and revolves around the
idea that IEAs belonging to the same category are more likely to have a homogeneous effect
on a certain targeted pollutant, or group of targeted pollutants. For instance, the use of
closed-loop catalysts in gas-powered passenger cars, initially aimed at reducing emissions of
nitrogen oxides (NOx), may also lead to significant declines in emissions of volatile organic
compounds (VOC). Alternative techniques for reducing NOx emissions may also result in
lower sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions. Reductions of NOx emissions were mandated under
the 1988 Sofia Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
(LRTAP). Similarly, reductions of VOC, and SO2 emissions were targeted as part of the
Helsinki (1985), Geneva (1991), Oslo (1994), and Gothenburg (1999) protocols to the same
LRTAP Convention.
The results obtained after separating IEAs by category are presented in Table 5. As
before, the first column uses our binary measure of industry pollution intensity based on
CO2 emissions while columns 2-10 use average sectoral emissions and the associated princi-
pal component as alternative measures of sectoral pollution intensity. As can be seen, the
results involving acid rain and climate change agreements are very similar. Both types of
agreements result in small reductions in exports of the median manufacturing industry (typ-
ically around 0.5-2%) and exhibit similar compositional effects (i.e., statistically significant
and negative coefficient estimates on the interaction terms) and thus larger reductions for
the more pollution intensive industries. For the acid rain agreements, the decline in exports
for an industry at the 75th percentile of pollution intensity varies from 1.3% to 3.3% while
for the climate change agreement it varies from 1.2% to 5.1%.
In contrast, the trade effects induced by the ratification of ozone depletion (OD) agree-
ments appear to be very different. Throughout Table 5, the estimated coefficient on the
19The only climate change IEA is the Kyoto protocol. The two terms are used interchangeably throughout.
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interaction term for such agreements is actually positive and statistically significant. Thus,
we actually see evidence of a small shift towards dirtier industries (at least as measured by
emissions intensities) from ratification of the OD IEAs. The lack of evidence for a shift away
from pollution-intensive exports is probably due to the fact that none of the eight pollu-
tants included in our emissions data are targeted directly by the Montreal protocol and its
subsequent amendments.
In Table 6 we re-estimate the industry level regressions from Section 4.2 but allow the
coefficient estimates to vary over IEA categories. We first focus on the coefficients attached to
the AR differential, which, to a large extent, are in line with the discussion above. Specifically,
the estimates for the more pollution intensive industries (first row) are (almost) uniformly
negative while the coefficient estimates for the less pollution intensive industries (second
row) are typically positive. Thus, the negative compositional changes we observed in Tables
3 and 4 appear primarily driven by the set of acid rain agreements. In addition, one can
see that the negative compositional change (shift to cleaner exports) from ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol is almost entirely driven by large negative effects on exports of the most-
pollution intensive industries (i.e., other non-metallic minerals and coke, refined petroleum,
and nuclear fuel).
Finally, consistent with the results of Table 5, ratification of the OD IEAs exhibits no clear
pattern when industries are ordered by CO2 intensity (i.e., the coefficient estimates on both
the first and second rows exhibit an equal mix of positive and negative coefficients). However,
note that the ratification of OD IEAs negatively impacts exports of several industries where
ozone depleting substances are used as production inputs (i.e., basic and fabricated metals,
transport equipment, and machinery), for which the declines in exports range from 1.6 to
3.2% and are statistically significant. An exception is electrical and optical equipment, which
actually exhibits a small export increase from ratification of the OD agreements. These
results indicate the peculiarity of OD IEAs and the need to treat them differently. Thus, in
Subsection 4.4.2 we attempt to construct OD IEAs-specific measures of sectoral pollution
intensity to better assess the effects of ratifying such agreements.
4.4 Robustness Analysis
Having verified the existence of compositional effects stemming from the ratification of
IEAs with (expected) differences across sectors and by type of IEA, it is important to ascer-
tain that these results are robust before building on them to investigate further aspects (i.e.,
pollution leakage, dynamic effects, and employment changes). We first engage in methologi-
cal checks and vary the way in which we identify the coefficients of interest. Then, we change
our regressors of interest or sample of countries and sectors to make sure that the results are
not driven by the sample composition or the construction of regressors. In order to save on
space, all tables of results are relegated to the Appendix and include only three specifications
for each robustness check, using the binary variable, CO2, and principal component (with
the remaining results available upon request).
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4.4.1 Multilateral Resistance
One of the main motivations of this paper is to estimate whether the decline in manufac-
turing exports experienced in the United States of America and the European Union is tied
to more stringent environmental regulations brought about by membership in IEAs aimed at
reducing air pollution. However, as in Aichele and Felbermayr (2015), estimating the impact
of IEA ratification (i.e., estimating β1) rests on the assumption of symmetric, country fixed
effects across both importer and exporter. That is, unobserved factors affect trade flows sim-
ilarly, regardless if a country is an exporter and importer. The obvious question that arises is
whether this assumption is driving our results. This concern is especially important as, since
Anderson and Wincoop (2003), it has become common in the structural gravity regression
literature to have separate importer and exporter fixed effects to control for multilateral
resistance terms pertaining to the exporter and importer (see Head and Mayer (2014)).
Note, first, that we only require this symmetry assumption to be able to identify the
coefficient β1, which captures the baseline effect of IEAs on exports (irrespective of how pol-
luting a sector is).20 However, a large part of the analysis within this paper focuses on the
compositional shifts in trade across manufacturing industries, β2, which can be estimated
even when the time-varying fixed effects are differing along the importer and exporter di-
mensions. Using this alternative methodology does not change our qualitative results, which
are presented in the first three columns of Table A4. In particular, the estimated coefficient
on the interaction term is negative, statistically significant, and virtually identical with the
β2 coefficients shown in Table 3. Once again, this implies that the ratification of IEAs (by
the exporting country) results in a shift of exports towards cleaner industries over the time
period. It is important to note that, since we cannot estimate β1, we are not able to calcu-
late the marginal effects of IEA ratification on sectoral exports along the emission-intensity
distribution as done in Table 3. Nevertheless, to assist with the interpretation of these re-
sults, we calculate the marginal change of IEA ratification (by the exporting country) on
the exports of an industry if it were moved from the 25th to the 75th percentile of emissions
intensity. These relative marginal effects are shown at the bottom of Table A4 and they con-
firm the conclusions reached when examining the marginal effects in Table 3. Focusing on
the first column, one can observe that the ratification of an IEA (by the exporter) decreases
exports of a dirty (e.g., basic and fabricated metals) industry by 2% relative to exports of a
clean industry (e.g., textiles and textile products). In the second column, exports of sectors
located at the 75th percentile of CO2-intensity distribution (i.e., chemicals, and chemical
products) decline by 1.5%, relative to those sectors located at the 25th percentile (i.e., food,
beverages, and tobacco). The remaining estimates illustrate a similar point. That is, exports
of manufacturing sectors located at the 75th percentile of the emission intensity distribution
tend to see declines of 1.3% or less when compared to sectors at the 25th percentile.
20Intuitively, identification of β1 comes from variation in net exports across trading partners. At any
point in time, the d(IEA)xmt variable will be (linearly) increasing for some trading partners and decreasing
for others as IEA ratification occurs. The assumption of symmetry results in a single time-varying country
fixed effect across these trade flows which allows for identification. If we do not impose symmetry, then there
will be two time-varying country fixed effects (one for the import side and one for the export side), which
will absorb the variation in d(IEA)xmt, and thus render β1 as unidentifiable.
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A different way to identify β1 is to employ a non-linear version of relative environmental
stringency between the exporting and importing countries:
d(IEA)2xmt =
IEA2xt − IEA2mt
(IEAxt + 1)(IEAmt + 1)
. (3)
The above measure rests on the assumption of diminishing marginal effects to IEA rat-
ification and the resulting non-linearity makes identification of the IEA differential (i.e.,
β1) possible even when the multilateral resistance terms are proxied with asymmetric time-
varying importer and exporter fixed effects for each country. Although the formula in (3)
seems to be very different from the linear counterpart used in the main text, note that the
correlation between the two measures is 0.84. With this alternative formulation, we can
estimate:
lnTxmst = β1d(IEA)2xmt+ β2d(IEA)2xmt×Ds+ γTAxmt+ νxt+ νmt+ νst+ νxms+ xmst. (4)
The only distinction between this specification and that of (2) is our use of the non-
linear measure of the IEA differential. The results of estimating (4) are presented in the
first three columns of Table A5. As can be seen, the coefficient estimates are very similar
to those for our linear specification in Table 3 and exhibit the same pattern (i.e., β1 < 0
and β2 < 0). The first three columns of Table A5 also shows the marginal effects of IEA
ratification on exports for the average country pair at the midpoint of our sample period
(i.e., 1994).21 It is worth pointing out that a pattern similar to that in Table 3 emerges.
Specifically, estimates underline a moderate, negative effect of IEA ratification on the typical
manufacturing industry and a compositional shift towards cleaner industries. In this case,
both effects are slightly muted, partly due to the diminishing marginal returns assumption
embedded in the non-linear measure. That is, by 1994, many countries had signed multiple
IEAs and thus the marginal effect of ratifying an additional IEA is reduced by construction.
Finally, and to further check the impact of the symmetry assumption, we re-estimate
(4) but allow the time-varying fixed effects to vary across import and export flows. Results
of this specification are reported in the last three columns of Table A5. The coefficient
estimates (and marginal effects) outlined here are very similar to those in the first three
columns of Table A5. Indeed, the major effect of relaxing the symmetry assumption is
higher standard errors (and a somewhat reduced statistical significance) with almost no
change in the coefficient estimates themselves. We interpret this as indicative evidence that
the symmetry assumption regarding the country fixed-effects is not driving our results.
4.4.2 Montreal Protocol and Ozone Depletion Agreements
As seen in Section 4.3, there is a fair degree of heterogeneity across treaty types with
regards to the effect of IEAs on the industrial composition of exports. Obviously, the main
reason for this heterogeneity is that the acid rain and climate change agreements target
emissions of pollutants that are similar and correlated across industries. Conversely, ozone
21In 1994, the average exporter ratified approximately three IEAs whereas the importer ratified only two.
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depletion IEAs are aimed at none of our considered emissions, but rather at substances such
as CFCs, BFCs, or HCFCs. This creates a problem as data on releases of ozone depletion
substances (ODSs) targeted under the Montreal Protocol, and its subsequent amendments,
are not available. However, an idea of the industries affected by this set of agreements can
be gained from the various reports that were produced in support of the Montreal protocol.
For example, the United National Environmental Programme (UNEP) produced a series of
reports (Ashford (2001), Kuijpers (2001), Staley (2001), Tope and Andersen (2001)) that
summarize the major issues concerning the replacement of ODSs by involved industries.
Those reports suggest that ODSs were used primarily for manufacturing of insulating foams
and as refrigerating agents in stationary and mobile air conditioning and refrigeration units
(suggesting machinery n.e.c. and transportation equipment as highly impacted sectors).
These substances were also used for the manufacturing of various foams, or solvents used
for high precision cleaning in the electrical and metal industries (suggesting electrical and
optical equipment along with basic and fabricated metals as highly impacted sectors).22 This
list of 4 main impacted industries is in line with a 2006 IPCC report (see Sanz Sánchez et al.
(2006)) about industrial processes that result in HCFC and HFC discharges across a range of
ISIC 2 (revision 3) manufacturing sectors.23 However, these reports also list a large number
of other end-uses for ODSs (and thus potential other industries that might be affected). For
example, ODSs were used as process agents in the chemical industry, dry cleaning agents in
the clothing industry, pesticides and drying agents in tobacco-processing activities, and for
the manufacturing of flexible foams for items ranging from packaging to shoes.24
Thus, using the UNEP reports, we construct a binary indicator for the set of four in-
dustries that are most commonly mentioned as using ozone depleting substances (ODSs):
machinery nec., transportation equipment, electrical and optical equipment, and basic and
fabricated metals (labeled Dodss ). This first column of Table A6 provides the results for our
base specification (i.e., (2)) in which Ds for the climate change (CC IEA) and acid raid (AR
IEA) agreements is the binary indicator for the 4 industries with the highest CO2 emissions
(DIRTY) and Ds for the ozone depletion (OD IEA) agreements is the newly constructed
binary indicator for ODSs (Dodss ). As can be seen, the results are in line with prior expec-
tations. That is, ratifying an ozone depletion agreement tends to reduce exports in the set
of industries that are commonly mentioned as utilizing ozone-depleting substances. Specifi-
cally, while we find no apparent effect of OD membership on exports for our set of ten clean
industries, we do find a decline in exports of about 1.2% in our set of four industries that
use ODSs more heavily. In columns 2 and 3, we replace the DIRTY indicator for the CC
and AR agreements with our carbon dioxide and principal component measures respectively
and find similar results (a decline in exports of around 1.2% for ODSs-intensive industries).
22An EPA study reported that 60% of methyl-chloroform usage was in metal cleaning while 70% of CFC-
113 usage was in electronics cleaning (see Sheppard et al. (2004)).
23Starting in the early 1990s CFCs and HCFCs were replaced/substituted by HFCs. Thus, tracking
industrial processes that release or use HFCs gives us additional insight about industries that may have been
affected by the ratification of ozone depletion IEAs.
24In addition, data from the EORA MRIO Project (see Lenzen et al. (2012, 2013)) points to surprisingly
high HFC (a common substitute for early ODSs) discharge intensities in some less-mentioned industries such
as textiles and wearing apparel.
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4.4.3 Kyoto Protocol and the Differential Treatment of Ratifiers
The Kyoto Protocol introduces yet another source of heterogeneity in allowing “common
but differentiated” responsibilities among parties, with Annex B members adopting explicit
emissions targets and non-Annex B members simply agreeing to “formulate programmes”
to mitigate climate change (see Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol). In the previous Sections
we treated membership in the Kyoto agreement as being solely given by countries that
both ratified the agreement and adopted explicit emission caps as part of the agreement.
However, this raises the question of how Kyoto membership affected the trade flows of non-
Annex B members. Thus, in the last three columns of Table A6 we consider the effect of
these differentiated responsibilities by distinguishing between Annex B and non-Annex B
members. Specifically, we construct two measures of our d(IEA)xmt variable for the climate
change agreement in which one (CC IEA All) treats a country as a member, regardless of
its responsibilities, so long as it ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The second measure (CC IEA)
treats a country as an adopter if it ratified the Kyoto Protocol and accepted explicit emission
caps (i.e, is an Annex B country).25
As can be seen from the last three columns in Table A6, Kyoto membership had rather
different effects on Annex B and non-Annex B countries. Marginal effects for industries
at different points in the distribution of pollution intensity are calculated at the bottom
of the table for both Annex B (Kyoto Ratifies w/ Cap) and non-Annex B countries (All
Kyoto Ratifiers). Interestingly, those countries which joined Kyoto but did not adopt any
explicit emission restrictions (non-Annex B) actually saw increased manufacturing exports
by a quantitatively and statistically significant 4%.26 However, we do not find robust evi-
dence for compositional changes for these non-Annex B members. Specifically, the coefficient
estimate on the interaction term is small and statistically insignificant (at least for our binary
and PC1 measures of pollution intensity). In contrast, the results for the Annex B members
are similar to our previous estimates and, if anything, exhibit even stronger compositional
switch towards cleaner production. For Annex B countries we find that industries below and
at the median pollution intensity saw increases in exports of 2-5% while industries at the
75th percentile and above saw declines of 2-5%. This stronger evidence for compositional
shifts towards cleaner goods for Annex B countries is consistent with the idea that only IEA
commitments that involve explicit emission targets are likely to have a significant effect on
industry-specific comparative advantage.
4.4.4 Additional Sensitivity Analysis
Table A7 presents the results of several different sensitivity analyses to our baseline
results provided in Table 3. Columns 1-3 exclude China (as importer and exporter) given
the significant increase in Chinese trade over the past several decades. Given the large
swings in the value of petroleum exports (often driven by the large swings in the price of
25It is worth pointing out that, while an Annex B country, the United States of America did not ratify
the Kyoto protocol. Because of this, we treat the U.S. as a non-ratifier. Further, Liechtenstein and Monaco
are also Annex B countries but not in our sample.
26It should be noted that the vast majority of countries in our sample are members of Kyoto. Indeed, the
only countries in our sample which failed to ratify Kyoto are Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and the U.S.
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fuel), columns 4-6 exclude the coke, petroleum and nuclear fuels industry.27 Finally, columns
7-9 take into account for exporter-importer differences in per-capita GDP.28 Intuitively, a
concern might be that the non-member countries in our sample have a different trend in
trade patterns than the member countries and, to the extent these different trends are not
captured by our time-varying country fixed effects, this could bias our estimates. It should
be apparent from Table 1 that member countries tend to be the richer (typically OECD
countries) while non-member countries are more likely to be developing country. Thus, we
also run our specifications including controls for these income differentials (both directly and
interacted with our IEA differential variable).
The results of these additional sensitivity checks are very similar to the baseline results.
Dropping China from the sample does not lead to any difference while the exclusion of the
petroleum sector leads to slightly larger (in absolute terms) coefficients but very similar
marginal effects. The addition of the per-capita GDP difference does not affect our main
results but demonstrate that exports are lower for larger differences in these welfare measures
but less so for more polluting industries.
5 IEAs and Pollution Leakage
The results of the previous sections provide evidence for comparative disadvantage for
pollution-intensive sectors that arises from IEA membership (i.e., a comparably larger reduc-
tion in net exports of more pollution-intensive manufacturing industries). However, because
of the imposed symmetry (needed in order to estimate β1), the previous specifications are
silent on whether this effect is primarily driven by a reduction in exports by member coun-
tries or by an increase in imports from non-member countries. This distinction is important
in the trade-environment literature because an increase in imports of pollution-intensive
goods implies that production of dirty goods by IEA adopters might simply be replaced by
increased production within non-member countries (i.e., pollution leakage). If IEAs are sim-
ply shifting production from member countries (with strengthened environmental standards)
to non-members (with relaxed standards), the reduction in global emissions is comparably
lessened.
Thus, to look for evidence of pollution leakage we consider a specification that uses sep-
arate exporter- and importer-specific measures of environmental commitment. This specifi-
cation is depicted in (5), where IEAxt denotes the number of ratified IEAs by the exporter
while IEAmt denotes the number of ratified IEAs by the importer.
lnTxmst = β3IEAxt ×Ds + β4IEAmt ×Ds + γTAxmt + νxt + νmt + νst + νxms + xmst, (5)
27As can be seen in the industry-level regressions, the number of observations for the petroleum industry
are significantly less than the other industries, and the coefficient estimates for the petroleum industry tend
to be somewhat variable (see, especially, Table 6).
28The GDP-per-capita differential is computed as the exporter-importer difference in the natural loga-
rithms of GDP per capita. GDP and population data are from version 8.1 of the Penn World Table Database
(Feenstra et al., 2015).
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Note that, since we have separate (linear) importer and exporter measures of IEA mem-
bership, we can no longer recover β1 (the uniform effect of IEA ratification on manufacturing
industry trade) since identification relied on variation across trading partners. However, we
can still recover the compositional effect of IEA ratification across manufacturing industries
(i.e., whether IEA ratification leads to a switch towards exporting cleaner goods). As we
are only measuring compositional effects across industries, we run the specification while
allowing for asymmetry in the country-year effects across import and export flows, just as
in Table A4. Once again, our prior is that β3 < 0 (i.e., ratification of an additional IEA
would lead to a shift towards exporting relatively cleaner goods by the member country)
and β4 ≥ 0 (i.e., ratification of an IEA leads to a shift towards importing relatively dirtier
goods by the member country). However, the focus for this section is whether the estimated
coefficient for β4 is zero or positive: a positive coefficient would be evidence for pollution
leakage (i.e., the signing of an IEA leads to a compositional shift towards imports of dirty
goods from the rest of the world) while a zero coefficient would imply no replacement of
dirty-good production from overseas.
5.1 Baseline Results
Given the degree of heterogeneity across IEAs demonstrated in Section 4.3, we estimate
(5) using separate measures of IEA counts for our acid rain, ozone depletion, and climate
change agreements. The results obtained this way are provided in Table 7. As in Section
4.4.2, when considering the climate change and acid rain agreements, we use sectoral emission
intensities (Ds) as measures of pollution intensity. However, when considering the ozone
depletion agreements, we use the binary indicator (Dodss ) for the set of four industries that
are more likely to release ozone depleting substances.29 First focus on the climate change
and acid rain agreements since those agreements target a common set of pollutants for
which we have emissions data. As can be seen, our results exhibit the expected negative
effect of IEA membership on exports of more pollution intensive goods (i.e., β3 < 0). To
interpret the magnitudes, we provide a series of relative, marginal effects of IEA ratification
on exports. Just as before, we are contrasting the change in exports for an industry located
at the 25th percentile of the emission intensity distribution (e.g., food and beverages) with
one at the 75th percentile (e.g., chemicals, and chemical products). Typically, we observe a
decline in exports of 1-4%, which is broadly consistent with our previous estimates. With
respect to pollution leakage, in general we see signs (on β4) that IEA ratification results in
the country importing relatively more pollution-intensive manufacturing goods from abroad
(i.e., β4 > 0). This result is especially strong when we measure sectoral dirtiness by using
CO2 emissions (the first two columns). In these cases, IEA ratification results in a relative
increase in imports of 4-5% (Kyoto) and 1-2% (Acid Rain IEAs) when moving from the
cleaner (25th) to dirtier (75th) industries. While a similar pattern is seen for the other
pollutants (β4 is typically positive), the estimates are not as large and in several cases are
29Results for the climate change and acid rain agreements are very similar if we continue to use Ds
(instead of Dodss ) as a measure of pollution intensity when estimating the effect of ratifying ozone agreements.
Consistent with the results in Table 6, ratifying an ozone depletion agreement continues to be correlated
with a shift in exports towards industries with high emission intensities (or high levels of Ds).
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statistically insignificant.
Next, focus on the ozone depletion agreements where, as in Table A6, we employ our
indicator variable for whether an industry is likely to use ozone depleting substances (Dodss ).
It is worth mentioning that, in Table 7, Dodss does not differ across columns. As before,
the ozone depletion agreements exhibit a negative compositional effect on dirty exports (a
decline of around 1.5% in the set of 4 industries that utilize ODSs). In addition, we see a
small amount of pollution leakage, as the ratification of an ozone depletion agreement by an
importing country increases the imports of ODS-intensive industries by around 0.9%.
Although there is serious economic and political concern about pollution leakage arising
from IEAs, our results suggest that when it occurs it is not quantitatively very large.
5.2 Country Heterogeneity
While the previous sections assume that the effects of IEA ratification are symmetric
across countries, one of the interesting aspects of more recent IEAs is that they often draw a
distinction between developed and developing countries. The Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change did this directly by outlining emission
targets on the more high-income (Annex B) countries, while allowing the vast majority of
member countries to join without any firm commitments (and even the Annex B countries
had differentiated emission targets). The Montreal Protocol and its subsequent amend-
ments also tended to provide developing countries with technology assistance as well as
reduced targets or delays in meeting commitments. In contrast, some of the earlier acid
rain agreements tended to impose more consistent emission reduction targets which were
applied symmetrically across member countries. The justification for this recent emphasis
on differential treatment is that emission reduction targets would have an unfair competitive
effect on developing countries due to the high fixed costs and technology requirements of
many abatement technologies. Thus, in this section, we estimate if IEA ratification had a
differential impact on developing countries by estimating if the compositional shift towards
cleaner exports (and any subsequent pollution leakage) was stronger for developing country
ratifiers.
To investigate this question we employ specification (5) but include an indicator variable,
Cx, for whether the ratifying country is a developing country:30
lnTxmst = β3IEAxt ×Ds + β4IEAmt ×Ds + β5IEAxt ×Ds × Cx+
+β6IEAmt ×Ds × Cx + γTAxmt + νxt + νmt + νst + νxms + xmst.
(6)
In this case, as before, our priors are that β3 < 0 and β4 ≥ 0, depending on whether or
not pollution leakage occurs. That is, IEA ratification leads to a compositional shift towards
dirtier exports and cleaner imports. The question of interest is whether this compositional
30We distinguish between developed and developing countries using data fromWorld Bank’s Country Clas-
sification, which is available at https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519. Specif-
ically, countries with levels of per-capita gross national income (GNI) greater than $12,236 in 2018 are clas-
sified as developed. Countries with per-capita GNIs below this threshold are classified as developing. A
detailed account of our breakdown is provided in Table A3.
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shift is larger for developing countries (i.e., β5 < 0 and β6 > 0) due to funding and technology
limitations in these lower-income countries.
The results are provided in Table 8, where we also allow the coefficient estimates to
vary over the different agreement types. As can be seen, this is important as there is
no clear pattern across the agreements (i.e., whether IEA ratification results in a greater
compositional shift in developing countries depends highly on the agreement).
First, consider the impact of IEA ratification on exports. Consistent with Table 7, the
coefficient estimates for each agreement type are negative for developed countries (i.e., β3 < 0
and thus ratifying an IEA is a source of comparative disadvantage for dirty manufacturing
industries). With respect to the Kyoto Protocol we observe a positive coefficient estimate
on the developing country interaction term (i.e., β5 > 0) implying that, even among Annex
B countries, developing countries that joined Kyoto observed a negative but reduced impact
on dirty good exports. In contrast the developing country interaction term is negative for
acid rain agreements (i.e., β5 < 0), which implies that developing countries that joined
the acid rain agreements saw comparatively larger reductions in pollution-intensive exports.
Finally, the coefficient estimates on the developing country interaction term are, in general,
not statistically significant for ozone depletion IEAs.
Thus, whether ratifying an IEA has a more negative competitive impact on low-income
countries appears to depend highly on the terms and structure of the agreement itself. With
respect to the effect on exports, the coefficient estimates seem consistent with the pattern
of differential treatment within the agreement. Specifically, IEAs that involve differentiated
emission targets (i.e., the Kyoto Protocol) bring about smaller comparative disadvantage
effects for developing countries wheareas IEAs with more symmetric emission targets (i.e.,
the acid rain IEAs) lead to larger compositional shifts among developing country ratifiers.
However, the story does become less clear on the import side. Once again and consistent
with Table 7, the ratification of IEAs by developed countries leads to the importation of more
dirtier goods (i.e., β4 > 0) for all agreement types. Thus, we once again find evidence that
IEA ratification leads to moderate amounts of pollution leakage in higher-income countries
(i.e., increased imports of dirty goods from non-member countries). However, the results for
the developing country interaction effects are now reversed with the Kyoto Protocol leading
to a larger shift towards pollution-intensive imports for developing countries (i.e., β6 > 0)
and the acid rain (AR) agreements seeing a smaller shift (i.e., β6 < 0 or statistically insignif-
icant).31 Thus while we do observe heterogeneity across a country’s level of development in
the impact of IEA ratification on trade flows, no clear pattern emerges from our estimates.
6 IEAs and their Short-Run and Long-Run Effects on Trade
In the previous sections we were capturing the average treatment effect (ATE) of IEA
ratification (i.e., the impact of ratifying an additional IEA on the average trade volume
over the time period following ratification). However, part of the motivation for the longer-
time span of our data set (1976-2011) is to capture both induced innovation and general
31And, finally, we observe large, statistically significant, negative coefficient estimates for β6 with respect
to the ozone depletion agreements.
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equilibrium effects from IEA membership. As discussed in Section 2, there are good reasons
to expect that, given delays in both innovation and factor movements, the short-run effects of
IEA membership on comparative advantage might differ from the long-run effects. Thus, to
more directly look at this distinction, we construct a 10-year, lagged version of our d(IEA)xmt
variable (i.e., d(IEA)xm,t−10) and include it in our specification.32
lnTxmst = β1d(IEA)xmt + β2d(IEA)xmt ×Ds + β3d(IEA)xm,t−10+
+β4d(IEA)xm,t−10 ×Ds + β5γTAxmt + νxt + νmt + νst + νxms + xmst
(7)
In this case, β1 and β2 capture the short-run effects of IEA ratification (ATEs within
10 years) while β3 and β4 capture changes in these estimates after 10 years of IEA mem-
bership. Given previous results, our priors are that β1 < 0 and β2 < 0. That is, IEA
ratification results in short-run comparative disadvantage, especially in pollution-intensive
manufacturing goods. Note that induced innovation (stricter regulations resulting in new
technologies/techniques in the long-run so as to minimize pollution abatement costs) would
result in β3 > 0 (reduced comparative disadvantage in manufacturing in general) and po-
tentially β4 > 0 (reduced comparative disadvantage in more pollution-intensive goods). In
contrast, larger general equilibrium effects would result in β4 < 0. That is, larger composi-
tional shifts towards cleaner production as factors of production have more flexibility to be
reallocated across industries in the long-run.
As for our main results, we present the estimated short- and long-run effects for our
baseline specification. Next, we investigate whether these estimates vary by industry and
IEA type. Using the baseline results, we also assess the employment effects of IEA ratification
while distinguishing among short- and long-run outcomes.
6.1 Baseline Results
We start by repeating the analysis of Section 4.1 but introduce 10-year lags for our dIEA
variable as in (7). As can be seen in Table 9, we find evidence for both induced innovation
(i.e., β3 > 0) and stronger general equilibrium effects (i.e., β4 < 0) in the long run across all
measures of pollution intensity.
At the bottom of the table we provide estimates of the marginal effects in the short run
(ATE in the first 10 years after ratification) and long run (ATE post 10-years after ratifica-
tion). Concentrating first on the short-run marginal effects, we see an even stronger evidence
for comparative disadvantage from IEA ratification than in Section 4.1. For example, using
the estimates of the first column which utilizes the binary indicator for Ds, we estimate that
the ratification of an additional IEA will decrease exports in each of the four dirty industries
by around 3.0% within the first 10 years. Likewise, the ratification of an additional IEA
will decrease exports in the set of 10 clean industries by a smaller but still quantitatively
significant 1.6%. A similar pattern of short-run comparative disadvantage in manufacturing
and pollution-intensive goods to IEA ratification can be seen in the other columns, which
involve estimates using alternate measures of Ds.
32This is somewhat similar to the approach of Baier and Bergstrand (2007) who utilize lagged variables
to capture the short-run versus long-run effects of trade agreements.
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The average treatment effects after 10 years is given by the sum of β1 and β3 for our set of
clean industries. As can be seen in the first column, the negative comparative disadvantage
effects for the median manufacturing industry disappear. Indeed, the ratification of an
additional IEA actually results in increased exports for the set of 10 clean industries (an
increase of 2.5%). In contrast, we continue to see a long-run decrease in exports for the 4 dirty
industries (a decline of 1.9%). A similar pattern of increased exports of clean manufacturing
goods and decreased exports of pollution-intensive goods in the long-run is apparent in each
of the other specifications that use different measures of pollutants. Thus, while we do find
that IEA ratification has a negative effect on the competitiveness of the typical (median)
manufacturing industry in the short-run, we do not find any evidence of negative effects in
the long-run. Indeed, exports of the median manufacturing industry actually increase. This
casts doubt on the storyline often presented in developed countries that IEA membership is
linked with a long-run decline in manufacturing exports. One obvious possibility to explain
these results is that induced innovation has reduced the costs of any increased regulations
and thus allowed manufacturing production to recover (at least for the typical manufacturing
industry).
Note, however, that the compositional shift towards cleaner manufacturing exports has
only intensified over time in the sense that the gap between the clean and dirty industries
has gotten larger in the long-run. Specifically, in both the short and long run we observe
relatively larger net export declines for the four pollution-intensive industries (regardless
of how pollution intensity is measured). However, in the short run, the difference in the
ATE between our sets of dirty and clean industries is only about 1.4 percentage points. In
contrast, in the long run, the difference in the ATE between the dirty and clean industries
has become much larger with dirty manufacturing exports declining by about 2.8 percentage
points more.33 These results are based on a 10-year window, which is chosen in a rather
ad-hoc fashon. However, the results are qualitatively similar when we repeat the analysis
for 5, 8 and 12 year lags (see Table A9 in the Appendix).
As a second approach, we repeat the industry-level regressions of Table 5 while including
the d(IEA)xm,t−10 variable. In this case, the coefficient estimate for d(IEA)xmt provides
the ATE for the first 10 years after ratification and the sum of the estimates for d(IEA)xmt
and d(IEA)xm,t−10 provides the long-run ATE. The results are provided in Table 10 and
are striking. Joining an IEA results in a generally negative effect on exports across almost
the entire range of manufacturing industries within the first ten years (i.e., the only pos-
itive effects on exports are recorded for the manufacture of furniture and recycled goods,
and the manufacture of wood products). However, post-10 years, exports in almost every
manufacturing industry have bounced back (positive and statistically significant coefficients
on d(IEA)xm,t−10 for 11 of our 14 manufacturing industries). Combining the two coeffi-
cient estimates we find that, after 10 years, IEA membership has typically reduced exports
33A more direct way of observing these compositional shifts is to repeat the analysis of Table A4, in
which we allow for asymmetric importer-year and exporter-year effects, and focus on recovering β2, while
still including the lagged d(IEA)xm,t−10 variable. These results are provided in the last three columns
of Table A4 and demonstrate similar results: a moderate compositional effect in the short run (i.e., shift
towards exporting cleaner goods) and a much stronger compositional shift in the long run. This stronger
compositional shift is bolstering the long-run general equilibrium effects discussed in Section 2.
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in the more pollution-intensive industries (e.g., declines of 4.3% in non-metallic minerals,
2.6% in basic and fabricated metals, 2.3% in chemicals, and chemical products). However,
such membership has actually resulted in increased exports in the cleaner manufacturing
industries in the long run (e.g., increases of 5.1% in leather and footwear, 2.3% in textiles
and textile products, 0.8% in food, beverages, and tobacco, etc.). Once again, these results
are consistent with a story that induced innovation leads to the recovery of exports across
all manufacturing industries, while lagged general equilibrium effects are suggestive of a
compositional shift towards cleaner manufacturing.
6.2 Heterogeneity of IEAs
Given the evidence on the heterogeneity of IEAs established in Section 2.2, we re-estimate
specification (7) but allow the coefficient estimates to vary across the three major categories
of IEAs: climate change, acid rain, and ozone depletion. Note that, since ratification by
Annex B countries for the Kyoto Protocol begins in 2001 and our dataset only extends to
2011, we cannot recover long-run estimates for our sole climate change agreement. Also,
given that the ozone depletion agreements are not targeting our measured emissions, we
use the binary indicator for the set of four industries that use ozone depleting substances
more heavily (i.e., basic metals, transport equipment, electrical and optical equipment, and
machinery n.e.c.), as our ozone depletion-relevant measure of Ds.
Results (and marginal effects of ratification for the short and long run) are provided in
Table 11. Focusing first on the results for the climate change and acid rain agreements,
note that both types of agreements continue to induce short-run comparative disadvantage
in clean (β1 < 0) and pollution-intensive manufacturing industries (β2 < 0). Short-run
marginal effects are provided at the bottom of Table 11 for the acid rain agreements and
demonstrate negative effects of IEA ratification on both the typical manufacturing industry
(declines in exports of around 2.5%) and the most pollution-intensive (declines of around
3-5%).
However, consistent with the results of the previous section, the long-run estimates for the
acid rain agreements exhibit both a recovery of exports across all manufacturing industries
(β3 > 0) combined with increased compositional shifts across industries (β4 < 0). The
bottom panel of Table 11 provides the long-run estimates for the acid rain agreements. Note
that ratification of an acid rain agreement actually leads (after 10 years) to a small increase
in exports of the typical manufacturing industry (for the median industry an increase of
less than 1%). However, our estimates suggest a continuing compositional shift away from
pollution-intensive manufacturing as, in the long run, we estimate a decline of around 2-4%
in the most pollution-intensive manufacturing industries.
With respect to the ozone depletion agreements, the results of Table 11 suggest a modest
compositional shift in the short-run. That is, an increase of 0.5% in our set of 10 clean
industries and a decline in exports of 0.6% for our set of 4 dirty industries. In contrast, in the
long run, we observe almost no evidence of any negative comparative advantage effects from
34This is potentially related to the fact that substitutes for ozone-depleting substances were readily-
available and/or the use of such substitutes implied lower overall costs. Indeed, Slechten and Verardi (2016)
underline that the use of CFC-free as opposed to CFC-based refrigerants is associated with energy savings.
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the ratification of the ozone depletion IEAs. In fact, indeed, we observe almost a uniform
increase of 3% across all manufacturing industries. This seems much more consistent with
the induced innovation story than the results for acid rain agreements.34
An alternative perspective is provided by the industry-level results shown in Table 12.
Results for the acid rain agreements are very similar with those in Table 11. In the short run
we observe almost uniformly negative effects of IEA membership on manufacturing exports
(the only statistically significant positive result on dIEAxmt for the acid rain agreements
among the 14 industries is that concerning wood and products of wood and cork). However,
the results are completely reversed in the long-run. That is, almost every industry sees a
recovery in exports after 10 years (now, the only statistically significant negative result among
the 14 industries on dIEAxm,t−10 is for chemicals and chemical products). Combining the
two estimates, we see long-run declines in the more pollution-intensive industries (decreases
in exports of 2.3% in other non-metallic minerals, 3% in basic and fabricated metals, and
5.4% in chemicals and chemical products, etc.). However, after 10 years, we see that the
ratification of an acid rain agreement is leading to (net) increases in exports of the cleaner
industries (e.g., increases of 9.3% in leather and footwear and 7.9% in textiles and textile
products).
Short-run estimates for the ozone depletion agreements are more mixed and, consistent
with the results of Subsection 4.4.2, the estimates exhibit no clear pattern when industries are
arranged by CO2 intensity. However, for those industries that are estimated to be negatively
affected by the ratification of an ozone depletion agreement (basic and fabricated metals,
transport equipment, pulp, paper and printing and publishing, machinery n.e.c., textiles and
textile products, and leather and footwear) we find that this negative impact is short lived.
That is, for each of these industries (with the exception of textiles and textile products)
we find a statistically significant recovery of exports (at the least bringing exports back to
initial levels). Indeed, the results of Table 12 are suggestive of the fact that ozone depletion
agreements appear to also have had no long-run negative effects on manufacturing exports.
6.3 IEAs and the Long Run Decline of Manufacturing Employment
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the motivations for this paper is to see the
extent to which the long-run decline of manufacturing employment in the developed coun-
tries (e.g., United States and the European Union) is tied to the ratification of multilateral
environmental agreements. The working hypothesis is that the adoption of international
environmental agreements places manufacturing industries at a competitive disadvantage in
world markets. In this regard, the results of the previous section are suggestive in that the
negative competitive effects of IEA ratification on the median manufacturing industry dis-
appear in the long-run. However, the ratification of IEAs could still have a negative effect
on manufacturing employment (even in the long-run) if the compositional shifts caused by
subsequent environmental regulations/standards shifted production away from more labor-
intensive industries.
Thus, to provide some back-of-the-envelope estimates of the competitive effect of IEA
ratification on manufacturing employment in high-income countries we make the following
basic assumptions:
• A $1 increase in exports in an industry results in a $1 increase in domestic production
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in that industry (and only that industry);
• A $1 increase in imports in an industry results in between $0 and $1 decrease in
domestic production in that industry (and only that industry);
• The labor/output ratio for each industry is fixed and does not differ across sub-sectors
within our aggregate industry classifications.
From our basic specification (7) β1+β2×Ds is (approximatively) the short-run percentage
increase in exports (or decrease in imports) resulting from ratifying a single IEA while
(β1 + β3) + (β2 + β4)×Ds is the percentage increase in exports in the long run. Let Xjs be
total exports for country j in industry s,Mjs be total imports for country j in industry s and
Ljs be the labor/output ratio for industry s in country j. First, assume that any increase in
imports does not crowd out domestic production. Then, by our three assumptions, the total
change in manufacturing employment in the short-run due to ratifying an IEA for country
j is given by
∑
s
[(β1 + β2 ·Ds) ·Xjs · Ljs]. (8)
Note that the above is only estimating the loss (or gain) in manufacturing employment
due to changes in the competitiveness of a country’s manufacturing in world markets (i.e.,
changes in employment due to changes in trade flows with the rest of the world). In ad-
dition, the above calculation is looking at the effects of IEA ratification on manufacturing
employment holding the actions of the country’s trading partners constant.
Second, assume that any increase in imports perfectly crowds out domestic production.
Then, by combining the first and third of our assumptions, the total change in manufacturing
employment in the short run due to ratifying an IEA for country j is given by
∑
s
[(β1 + β2 ·Ds) · (Xjs +Mjs) · Ljs]. (9)
Thus, (8) and (9) can serve as upper and lower bounds on the employment changes driven
by IEA ratification. The long-run employment changes can be calculated symmetrically using
the long-run coefficient estimates. Using these formulas, we calculate the ratification effects
on employment in the United States and Germany by using trade, employment, and output
data from 200935 The results of these calculations are provided in Table 13 in the Appendix.
First, focus on the calculated employment effects of IEA ratification in the short run. In
Table 13 the rows labeled Marginal Effects (Lower Bound) provide the employment calcu-
lations where an increase in imports is assumed to have no effect on domestic production
while Marginal Effects (Upper Bound) assumes that an increase in foreign imports perfectly
crowds out domestic production. In this discussion, and without loss of generality, we will
just concentrate on the first column estimates which use the binary indicator of industry
pollution-intensity (it should be immediately apparent that the story is consistent across
352009 is the last year for which we have data on sectoral employment. Trade data and labor/output
ratios for the U.S. and German manufacturing industries are given in Table A8.
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the other measures of pollution intensity). As can be seen, we calculate that ratifying an
additional IEA would result in manufacturing employment falling by between 47, 000 and
115, 000 in the U.S. and between 70, 000 and 123, 000 in Germany.36 Given that, in 2009,
total manufacturing employment in the U.S. was 12.578 million and 7.163 in Germany, these
numbers are comparatively small (i.e., decreases of 0.91% and 1.71%, respectively). However,
they still represent a noticeable change in manufacturing employment that might provide
insight into why the decision to join a new IEA is so often controversial.
Next, focus on the calculated employment effects of IEA ratification in the long-run.
Marginal effect estimates provided in Table 13 suggest that ratifying an additional IEA leads
to an increase in manufacturing employment in the long-run of between 11, 000 and 32, 000
in the U.S. and between 13, 000 and 23, 000 in Germany. These are obviously very small
increases relative to the size of manufacturing employment in both countries. However, they
reinforce the conclusion of Section 6, that the long-run decline in manufacturing employment
seen in many high-income countries (such as the United States and Germany) is most likely
not related to the stringent environmental standards brought about by IEA membership.
7 Conclusions
This paper aims at providing some rigorous empirical evidence on the link, if any, between
decreasing shares of manufacturing activities (i.e., exports and employment) in developed
countries and membership in IEAs. Often regarded as part of the globalization process, IEAs
are often portrayed and perceived as damaging to a country’s competitiveness because of the
implied costs of having to abide by more stringent regulations. Exploiting a large dataset
that spans almost 40 years and more than 160 countries, we are able to provide answers on
the link between the two phenomena. Crucially, we can distinguish between the short and
long-run effects of IEAs on manufacturing exports and employment.
The main conclusion of this paper can be summarized in two points. First, over the last
four decades the ratification of IEAs (especially by developed countries) does not appear
to have had much impact on aggregate manufacturing exports or employment. Specifically,
while we find a moderate negative effect of IEA ratification on the exports of the typical
manufacturing industry (i.e., located at the median of the pollution intensity distribution)
in the short-run, this negative competitive impact disappears in the long-run. In addition,
some back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that countries that ratify an IEA agreement
have actually seen a (small) increase in manufacturing employment in the long-run (relative
to the control group of non-ratifiers).
This finding does have implications for the policy debates that often emerge about
36In both the U.S. and Germany the labor/output ratio in clean industries is (on average) larger than that
for dirty industries and thus the compositional shift towards clean exports actually increases manufacturing
employment. Thus, the short-run decline in employment is due entirely to the negative competitive effects
of IEA ratification on the median manufacturing industry. Similarly, the difference in labor-output ratios
between dirty and clean production is larger in the U.S. and thus the reason we estimate larger employment
losses to IEA ratification in Germany, at least in the short-run, is entirely because German manufacturing
is more open to foreign trade (i.e., the ratio of trade, especially exports, to domestic production is higher in
Germany).
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whether to join an IEA (especially those IEAs where many developing countries are either
non-ratifiers or have differential commitments) and that often revolve around the effect of
IEA ratification on a country’s competitiveness. The main concern is that the environmental
commitments required by such agreements would lead to an increase in manufacturing costs,
which places that country’s manufacturing base at a competitive disadvantage on world mar-
kets and thus leads to a long-run decline in manufacturing exports and employment. Our
results suggest that such concerns are potentially overblown.
Our second main result is that joining an IEA does have substantial impact on the
composition of a country’s manufacturing exports. Specifically, for all environmental agree-
ment types analyzed, we observe a statistically and quantitatively significant shift in net
exports away from “dirty” industries and towards “clean” industries within countries that
ratify IEAs. In addition, this compositional shift is actually larger in the long-run than the
short-run. While this compositional shift is mostly seen as a decline in exports from dirty
manufacturing industries (and simultaneous increase in exports of clean manufacturing in-
dustries), we also see some evidence for pollution leakage (i.e., an increase in dirty imports
from non-ratifying countries).
While the focus of this paper is on the effect of IEA ratification on the “competitiveness”
of a country’s manufacturing sector, this second point has implications for the effectiveness
of IEAs in reducing emissions. Specifically, previous papers (e.g., Slechten and Verardi
(2016), Aichele and Felbermayr (2012), Grunewald and Martínez-Zarzoso (2011)) have found
that the ratification of an IEA is correlated with a subsequent decline in a country’s total
emissions. Our results suggest that IEA ratification is also correlated with a subsequent
shift towards exporting cleaner manufacturing goods. Thus, it seems possible that one of the
main mechanisms by which IEAs reduce emissions is through inducing a compositional shift
towards production of cleaner goods. If this is the case, and there exists a compensating
shift towards production of dirty goods in non-member countries, that would imply that
such IEAs are, perhaps, less effective in reducing global pollution than has been previously
thought (e.g., Aichele and Felbermayr (2015, 2012)). We leave this possibility to explore in
more detail in future work.
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Ratifiers as of 2011
Geneva Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP)
Helsinki Protocol for Reduction
of Sulphur Emissions (1985)
1985 Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium and Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Re-
public, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany Hungary, Italy, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine
Sofia Protocol on the Control
of Nitrogen Oxides and their
Transboundary Fluxes (1988)
1989 All Helsinki ratifiers plus Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovenia, Spain,
the United Kingdom, and the United States of America
Geneva Protocol on the Control
of Volatile Organic Compounds
and their Transboundary Fluxes
(1991)
1993 Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Es-
tonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Macedonia, Netherlands,
Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom
Oslo Protocol on Further Reduc-
tion of Sulphur Emissions (1994)
1995 All Geneva ratifiers plus Canada, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, and Slovenia; less Estonia,
Russia, and the United States of America
Aarhus Protocol on Persistent
Organic Pollutants (POP)
(1998)
1998 Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Rep.of, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom
Aarhus Protocol on Heavy Met-
als (1998)
1998 All Aarhus POP ratifiers plus the United States of America, less Iceland and Italy
Gothenburg Protocol to Abate
Acidification, Euthrophication
and Ground Level Ozone (1999)
2002 All Aarhus POP ratifiers plus the United States of America, less Cyprus, Estonia,
Iceland and Italy
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (VCPOL)
Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer (PSDOL) (1987)
1988 Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium and Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Canada,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Ukraine, the United King-
dom, the United States of America, Uzbekistan
London Amendment to Mon-
treal PSDOL (1990)
1990 All nations in table A3 except Angola, Bermuda, Hong Kong, and Macau
Copenhagen Amendment to
Montreal PSDOL (1992)
1993 All nations in table A3 except Angola, Bermuda, Guinea, Hong Kong, Kazakhstan,
Macau, and Nepal
Montreal Amendment to Mon-
treal PSDOL (1997)
1998 All nations in table A3 except Angola, Bermuda, Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea,
Hong Kong, Kazakhstan, Macau, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, and
Zimbabwe
Beijing Amendment to Montreal
PSDOL (1999)
2000 All nations in table A3 except Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bermuda,
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Cape Verde, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Dji-
bouti, Ecuador, Georgia, Guinea, Hong Kong, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Macau, Mau-
ritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, and
Zimbabwe
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
Kyoto Protocol (1997) 1998 All nations except Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and the United States of America
w/ emission target 2001 Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Belgium and Luxembourg, Canada, Croatia, Czech Re-
public, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine,
United Kingdom































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1: Correlation of Emission Intensities
CO2 CH4 N2O NOx SOx CO NMVOC NH3
CO2 1.00 0.78 0.59 0.91 0.82 0.85 0.75 0.55
CH4 0.78 1.00 0.68 0.68 0.80 0.84 0.89 0.54
N2O 0.59 0.68 1.00 0.65 0.53 0.38 0.67 0.93
NOx 0.91 0.68 0.65 1.00 0.88 0.73 0.74 0.64
SOx 0.82 0.80 0.53 0.88 1.00 0.83 0.79 0.45
CO 0.85 0.84 0.38 0.73 0.83 1.00 0.78 0.23
NMVOC 0.75 0.89 0.67 0.74 0.79 0.78 1.00 0.51
NH3 0.55 0.54 0.93 0.64 0.45 0.23 0.51 1.00
The table displays the correlations of log. emission intensities for various pollutants
across the 14 sectors considered. Note that sectoral emission intensities are 1995-2009
averages across a total of 40 countries. All intensities are measured in kg/USD1,000 of
output; 1995=100 @ Real LCU/USD





CO2 CH4 N2O NOx SOx CO NMVOC NH3
Panel A
PC1 4.68 0.59 0.40 0.42 0.09 0.28 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.08
PC2 2.05 0.26 0.02 -0.08 0.67 0.17 -0.08 -0.20 -0.04 0.68
PC3 1.10 0.14 0.43 -0.37 -0.19 0.71 0.02 -0.24 -0.24 -0.13
Panel B
PC1 AR 2.32 0.58 0.48 0.62 0.59 0.18
PC2 AR 1.01 0.25 0.22 -0.25 -0.20 0.92
Panel C
PC1 CC 1.67 0.56 0.68 0.69 0.24
PC2 CC 0.96 0.32 -0.19 -0.15 0.97
Note: Each panel displays the factor loadings for those principal components with eigenvalues greater
than 1. The only exception appears in panel B. The proportion of emission intensity variance, across
all 8 pollutants, acid rain (AR) pollutants, and climate change (CC) pollutants captured by each
component, is also displayed.
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Barbados Hong Kong Romania
Belarus Hungary Russian Federation
Belgium and Luxembourg Iceland Rwanda
Belize India Saint Kitts and Nevis
Benin Indonesia Saint Lucia
Bermuda Iran Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Bhutan Iraq Sao Tome and Principe
Bolivia Ireland Saudi Arabia
Bosnia and Herzegovina Israel Senegal
Botswana Italy Sierra Leone
Brazil Jamaica Singapore
Brunei Darussalam Japan Slovakia
Bulgaria Jordan Slovenia
Burkina Faso Kazakhstan South Africa
Burundi Kenya Spain
Cambodia Korea Sri Lanka
Cameroon Kuwait Sudan
Canada Kyrgyzstan Suriname
Cape Verde Lao People’s Democratic Republic Swaziland
Central African Republic Latvia Sweden
Chad Lebanon Switzerland
Chile Lesotho Syrian Arab Republic
China Liberia Taiwan
Colombia Lithuania Tajikistan
Comoros Macau Tanzania, United Rep. of
Congo Macedonia (the former Yugoslav Rep. of) Thailand
Costa Rica Madagascar Togo
Croatia Malawi Trinidad and Tobago
Cyprus Malaysia Tunisia
Czech Republic Maldives Turkey
Cote d’Ivoire Mali Turkmenistan
Denmark Malta Uganda
Djibouti Mauritania Ukraine
DoMin. ica Mauritius United Kingdom
DoMin. ican Republic Mexico United States of America
Ecuador Moldova, Rep. of Uruguay
Egypt Mongolia Uzbekistan
El Salvador Morocco Venezuela






All countries appear as both exporters and importers with the exception of Chad, Equatorial Guinea,
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Uzbekistan. These six nations are only observed as im-
porters. Developing countries (GNI per capita ≤ $12,235) are marked in italics. According to
the World Bank, these are low-income-, lower-middle-, and upper-middle-income countries. See
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519 for additional details.
51
Table A4: Linear and Linear 10-Year Lagged Environmental Stringency Differential and
the Margins of IEA Ratification
Pollutant: Multilateral Resistance Terms Multilateral Resistance Terms
and Short- and Long-Run Effects
DIRTY CO2 PC1 DIRTY CO2 PC1
Econ. Integration 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
d(IEA) × Ds -0.018∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
lag d(IEA) ×Ds -0.014∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Obs. 3,014,623 3,014,623 3,014,623 3,014,623 3,014,623 3,014,623
Adj. R-Squared 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.822
Reporter × Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partner × Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rep. × Par. × Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes









Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the exporter-importer-industry level. ∗∗∗
p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A5: Non-Linear Environmental Stringency Differential
Pollutant: Non-Linear IEA Differential Non-Linear IEA Differential and
Multilateral Resistance Terms
DIRTY CO2 PC1 DIRTY CO2 PC1
Econ. Integration 0.138∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
NL d(IEA) -0.008∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.008 0.043∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗
(0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.007) (0.015) (0.006)
NL d(IEA) × Ds -0.022∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.017∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Obs. 3,042,630 3,042,630 3,042,630 3,014,623 3,014,623 3,014,623
Adj. R-Squared 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.822 0.822 0.822
Country × Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
Reporter × Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
Partner × Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair × Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marginal Effects 1994
Minimum -0.003∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.000 -0.004∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
25th Percentile -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.003 -0.004∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
50th Percentile -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.003 -0.004∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
75th Percentile -0.011∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.005∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Maximum -0.011∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the exporter-importer-industry level. ∗∗∗
p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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Kyoto w/ and w/o Cap
DIRTY CO2 PC1 DIRTY CO2 PC1
Econ. Integration 0.137∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
d(CC IEA) -0.001 0.122∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗ 0.077∗ -0.038∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.041) (0.007) (0.008) (0.045) (0.008)
d(CC IEA) × Ds -0.051∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.007) (0.005) (0.016) (0.008) (0.006)
d(AR IEA) -0.007∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002)
d(AR IEA) × Ds -0.025∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
d(OD IEA) 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
d(OD IEA) × Dodss -0.012∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
d(CC IEA All) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.036) (0.006)
d(CC IEA All) × Ds -0.013 -0.014∗∗ -0.004
(0.013) (0.006) (0.005)
Obs. 3,042,630 3,042,630 3,042,630 3,042,630 3,042,630 3,042,630
Adj. R-Squared 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.245
Country × Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Pair × Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effects × Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kyoto Ratifiers w/ Cap
Minimum 0.026∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009)
25th Percentile 0.026∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
50th Percentile 0.026∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
75th Percentile -0.033∗∗ -0.019∗ -0.017∗
(0.014) (0.010) (0.009)
Maximum -0.033∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.018) (0.039)
All Kyoto Ratifiers
Minimum 0.044∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
25th Percentile 0.044∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
50th Percentile 0.044∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
75th Percentile 0.031∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Maximum 0.031∗∗∗ 0.013 0.016
(0.011) (0.015) (0.033)
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered at the exporter-importer-industry level. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05,
∗ p<0.1.
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